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WHAT DO I WANT? THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL ASPIRATION AND 
RELATIONAL CAPABILITY ON COLLABORATION PREFERENCES 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Research Summary 
 
We examine individuals’ collaboration preferences in the Knowledge Transfer Network 
(KTN) for the UK plastics electronics sector. Using conjoint analysis, we investigate how 
aspiration gaps and relational capability affect the value placed on potential organizational 
collaborations. Aspiration gaps reflect individuals’ perception of whether they are ahead or 
behind peers on their career trajectory, and relational capability captures three distinct 
dimensions: networking skills, openness to collaborate, and network awareness. Our findings 
suggest that positive and negative aspiration gaps augment preferences to form organizational 
partnerships. These effects are positively moderated by networking skills and openness and 
negatively moderated by network awareness. We discuss the implications of these findings 
for theories of partnership formation, scientific collaboration, and behavioral strategy.   
 
Managerial Summary 
University-Industry collaboration is important to the creation and application of new 
knowledge. Such collaboration requires individuals of different backgrounds to work 
together, which can be difficult. We investigate what drives individuals’ preferences to 
collaborate. We find that individuals who consider themselves ahead or behind their peers are 
more favorable toward collaboration. We also find that networking skill and openness 
augment this positive collaboration disposition whereas awareness of the network members 
makes one more selective and reduces the proclivity to collaborate.  
KEYWORDS: aspirations, collaboration, conjoint analysis, networks, preferences, R&D 
3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Technological progress and the production of science are predominantly collaborative 
endeavors of individuals. Since specialization has become a prerequisite to advancing the 
knowledge frontier, collaborators increasingly bridge scientific domains and cross 
organizational boundaries (Jones, 2009; Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi, 2007). Such complex 
collaborations have rightly assumed great strategic importance due to their prevalence and 
potential for value creation (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2011). Yet, collaboration across 
organizational and knowledge contexts is also riskier and raises coordination costs due to 
mutual knowledge deficits (Kotha, George, and Srikanth, 2013; Vural, Dahlander, and 
George, 2013).  
Collaboration research has acknowledged that economic relations are often 
“embedded in social relations of friendship and trust between people” (Kilduff and Brass, 
2010, p. 324). As such, attention had been paid to dyadic characteristics of collaborations 
such as homophily, interpersonal trust, and affect (Casciaro and Lobo, 2008; Vissa, 2011). In 
addition, researchers have investigated how to access domain knowledge via high profile 
partners, for instance through alliances with star scientists (Hess and Rothaermel, 2011). 
Within the broader literature on inter-organizational relations, there is some consensus 
that firm, partner, task, institutional, dyadic-relational, and network characteristics all matter 
(Bierly and Gallagher, 2007; Geringer, 1991; Hitt et al., 2000) and that opportunities to form 
ties are unequally distributed (Ahuja, 2000; Alnuaimi, Singh, and George, 2012; Mitsuhashi 
and Greve, 2009). Because existing ties are the outcomes of a matching process in which 
partners select each other (Gale and Shapley, 1962), deriving antecedents of tie formation ex 
post can only partially illuminate ex ante motives and preferences (Mindruta, 2013). 
Preferences that do not result in established ties remain hidden from investigation so that 
existing ties are a poor proxy for tie formation intention (Vissa, 2011). While it is not self-
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evident that individual preferences translate to organizational action (Powell, Lovallo, and 
Fox, 2011), it is also not so that what drives people to collaborate is necessarily transparent in 
established collaborations (Stuart and Sorenson, 2007). Studying preferences thus allows us 
to look at the behavioral origins of tie formation, before the matching process comes into 
play. 
Given the critical role played by individuals in the tie formation process, we examine 
how individual attributes shape preferences to form organizational partnerships. This topic 
has largely escaped scholarly attention, an omission rooted in the implicit assumption that 
individuals are homogeneous, malleable beings that are randomly distributed into 
organizations, thus suppressing “questions regarding motivation, preferences, [and] abilities” 
(Felin and Foss, 2005, p. 450). Our focus on strategy’s micro-foundations, helps “to better 
understand the origins and the level of intentionality of aspirations in organizational practice” 
(Shinkle, 2012, p. 442). Survey data from KTN1 members in the UK plastic electronics sector 
provide a novel context for research dominated by semiconductor and pharmaceutical studies. 
We use conjoint analysis (Green, Krieger, and Wind, 2001) to analyze how aspiration gaps 
shape collaboration propensities. While this method is commonly used in marketing and has 
seeped into research on venture capitalists (Franke et al., 2006) and innovation (Riquelme 
and Rickards, 1992), our focus on variables outside the conjoint design to illuminate the role 
of individual characteristics, is novel.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Individual Aspiration and Collaboration Preference 
Decision-makers typically evaluate outcomes based on historical or social reference 
points, commonly referred to as aspirations (Shinkle, 2012). Facing an aspiration gap (being 
above or below a reference point) influences the intensity and choice of behaviors (Cyert and 
                                                          
1 Knowledge Transfer Networks in the UK are initiated by the government to support collaborative innovation 
and commercialization of new products. 
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March, 1963). Behavioral theory argues that when people (or organizations) fall below an 
aspiration level they take more risks and engage in problemistic search in order to catch-up, 
while those that are ahead become either risk-averse in order to maintain their position, or use 
their resource excess to engage in risky, and often wasteful, slack search (Leonard-Barton, 
1992; March and Shapira, 1987). Because collaboration is inherently risky (Lhuillery and 
Pfister, 2009), it is reasonable to assume that aspiration gaps influence collaboration 
preferences in a similar fashion  Whether to partner with familiar or unfamiliar partners is 
influenced by how firms perform relative to aspirations (Greve, 2003) and underperformance 
drives organizations to develop new ties (Baum et al., 2005). Because organizational theory 
“frequently discusses organizational aspirations as a managerial-level construct” (Shinkle, 
2012, p. 424), this logic likely resonates at the individual level. Social Comparison Theory 
(SCT) suggests that negative aspiration gaps will instigate action to increase similarity so that 
those who are behind catch up while those who are ahead could “devote considerable time 
and effort to trying to improve the performance of the others in the group to a point where at 
least some of them are close, but not equal to, [them]” (Festinger, 1954, p. 127). Thus, while 
behavioral theory implies positive aspiration gaps will reduce risk-taking (March and 
Shapira, 1987) and hence lower collaboration preferences, SCT suggests positive gaps could 
lead to helping (Festinger, 1954), and thus higher collaboration preferences.  
While SCT is commonly studied in the context of opinions or abilities in groups, it 
has not been extended to look into collaboration preferences across organizations, in which 
‘helping’ is presumably less common. Yet, there is evidence that in emerging technological 
areas, cumulative knowledge development makes the entire area more valuable so that “it is 
in the collective interest of all participants to invest to create a substantive body of underlying 
scientific knowledge, and even to share this knowledge” (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004, p. 6). 
At the individual level, researchers have found that status benefits, having been the recipient 
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of help before, and perceptions about those needing help are all likely to influence helping 
(Flynn and Lake, 2008; Grodal, Nelson, and Siino, 2015; McNeely and Meglino, 1994). It 
thus seems likely that negative aspiration gaps will stimulate collaboration preferences while 
positive gaps result in two mechanisms pulling in different directions, so that a main effect is 
unlikely. If only risk averseness (helping) would matter, those experiencing a positive 
aspiration gap would have a lower (higher) propensity to collaborate than those who do not 
face an aspiration gap. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Performance below a social aspiration level (doing worse than peers) 
will increase an individual’s propensity to collaborate.  
 
Relational Capability as Moderator of Aspiration-Preference Relationship 
Individuals are concerned with the subjective likelihood of failure when they aim to 
maximize expected utility (Siegel, 1957). Thus capabilities that can affect collaborative 
success or failure are likely to moderate the aspiration-preference relationship, because 
relevant capabilities can be used to influence aspirational gaps (Ansoff, 1979). In his review 
of the aspirations literature, Shinkle (2012) observed that the moderators of the aspiration-
consequence relationship remain understudied.  
Moving beyond previously studied one-to-one relational aspects like interpersonal 
trust and affect (Casciaro and Lobo, 2008), we posit that an individual’s generic one-to-many 
relational capability will affect collaboration preferences. This echoes with recent findings in 
network research that claim that an actor’s network position is likely to be endogenous, and 
driven by performance (Lee, 2010). For example, networks seem to be formed around high 
performing scientists (Zucker and Darby, 2006) and are affected by aspects of  personality 
such as self-monitoring (Oh and Kilduff, 2008). We test whether this one-to-many relational 
capability, consisting of networking skills, networking openness, and network awareness, 
indeed affects collaboration preferences.  Figure 1 provides an overview of the hypothesized 
relationships. 
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-------------------------------- Insert figure 1 about here --------------------------- 
Networking Skills and Networking Openness 
We proffer that those with better networking skills and/or more openness will exploit 
those traits because they enhance success probability (Siegel, 1957) and perceived behavioral 
control (Ajzen, 1991) (see e.g. Gulati (1999) for support at the organizational level). High 
openness and/or high networking skills strengthen the ambition to catch up through 
collaboration for those who are trailing behind. On the contrary, low networking skills and/or 
low openness make slackers less likely to collaborate because of reputational risks and threat 
rigidity (Hu, Blettner, and Bettis, 2011). Individuals who are ahead of their peers are on the 
one hand risk averse which would decrease collaboration preference (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) but on the other hand want to help their distant peers come closer to them, 
much like a supervisor does with a PhD student (Festinger, 1954). Slack in combination with 
internal capabilities has been found to influence managers’ likelihood of seeking alliances 
(Patzelt et al., 2008). Merging those insights suggests that ‘leaders’ will be more inclined to 
collaborate when they perceive collaboration as safe, i.e. when they are open and/or skillful, 
but be averse to collaboration when they lack the needed capabilities.  
Hypothesis 2a: Networking skill positively reinforces the effect of an aspiration gap 
on general collaboration propensity 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Networking openness positively reinforces the effect of an aspiration 
gap on general collaboration propensity 
 
Network Awareness 
We conceptualize network awareness as how much an individual knows about other 
KTN members who are active in their focal technological domain. It thus has similarities to 
network centrality (Rowley, 1997) and social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). While 
alliancing is often associated with positive outcomes (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006), 
too many interpersonal relationships (or those that are too strong) progressively lower the 
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mean value of created knowledge (Lavie and Drori, 2012; McFadyen and Cannella, 2004). 
There is thus a dark side to social capital (Gargiulo and Benassi, 1999). Specifically, 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) suggest that individuals with high social capital might be less 
receptive to new information and diverse views. This could lower collaboration preferences.  
Individual perceptions about which knowledge others have increase the likelihood of 
seeking out specific individuals for information, i.e. knowledge makes one selective in 
partner choice (Borgatti and Cross, 2003). Network awareness then raises an individual’s 
ability to leverage other people’s expertise (Cross and Cummings, 2004), but in doing so it 
heightens the opportunity costs of collaboration as well. Thus, as high network awareness 
might increase selectiveness, it must lower the general proclivity to collaborate, due to higher 
opportunity costs of working with unfamiliar people or working with familiar individuals 
who are known to be suboptimal for the project at hand.  
These two arguments support the idea that network awareness will negatively affect 
collaboration outcomes. This effect will be stronger when respondents experience an 
aspiration gap. When individuals trail behind their peers and their network awareness is low, 
they will be risk-taking and positively disposed to different collaboration scenarios because 
they cannot be selective; however, this effect will reduce when network awareness increases. 
At the other end, when respondents don’t face obvious resource needs because they are ahead 
of competition (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996), high awareness and thus high selectivity 
raise opportunity costs of collaborating with the wrong partners, thereby decreasing 
collaboration preferences. When leaders have low network awareness they might be more 
prone to helping others, especially when they perceive collaboration as not too risky. While 
having higher awareness will make slackers more selective as well, their position of strategic 
need does not afford them the same selectivity as leaders. Relative to leaders, we expect them 
to maintain a higher collaboration preference, even when having high network awareness.  
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Hypothesis 2c: Network awareness negatively moderates the effect of an aspiration 
gap on general collaboration propensity.  
 
METHOD AND MEASURES 
 
We collected data from members of a UK-based KTN that supports organizations 
developing plastic electronics technology for displays and lighting, including SMEs, large 
companies, and universities. KTNs are publicly funded to improve the UK’s innovation 
performance and offer free membership, lowering barriers to join. As within-network 
dynamics differ across networks due to differences in mutual knowledge (Bechky, 2003), and 
because specific controls required in-depth network actor knowledge, we chose to limit 
ourselves to one KTN within which we were able to get a decent response rate.  
In October 2008, our focal KTN had approximately 800 members from 500 
organizations listed in its database, including a strong representation of senior executives. An 
online survey was sent to all 667 members with valid email address. After two email 
reminders, responses were received from 201 members (30%) by the end of December. 
Respondents were asked to identify their seniority and role within the organization, 50 were 
in technology transfer or business development roles and 151 were in research-related roles. 
Analysis of non-response using t-tests suggested that respondents were more likely to have 
attended events organized by the network (69% of respondents had attended events, 
compared to 53% in the whole population; p ≤ 0.001), were more likely to have prior 
experience of Collaborative R&D (53% of respondents compared with 40%; p ≤ 0.001) and 
were more likely to work for universities than companies (32% worked for universities, 
compared to 22% in the population; p ≤ 0.001).  
Conjoint Analysis and Cumulative Link Models 
We investigate our hypotheses using conjoint analysis. Conjoint analysis refers to the 
“decomposition into part-worth utilities or values of a set of individual evaluations of, or 
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discrete choices from, a designed set of multi-attribute alternatives” (Louviere, 1988, p. 93). 
Conjoint analysis is often used in marketing research to study preference structures 
underlying buying decisions as it has great potential for measuring trade-offs between multi-
attribute products and services (Green et al., 2001). The method’s premise is that preferences 
can best be gauged by asking respondents to judge a whole product (collaboration scenario in 
our case) rather than by enquiring about the relative value of each product attribute (scenario 
variable) because asking respondents to judge how unique attributes influence preferences is 
not a realistic task and would ignore respondent-specific attribute complementarities. The 
method is especially useful and a unique approach for studying perceptions and judgments of 
respondents and is normally used to deduce the importance of each scenario variable 
(Riquelme and Rickards, 1992). However, we use the conjoint method to control for scenario 
variety and focus on idiosyncratic respondent characteristics that alter the average preference 
rating above and beyond the presented scenarios. This allows us to explore which scenario-
independent variables influence differences in the response2. 
For the analysis of the data we use a cumulative link model (CLM) with flexible 
thresholds, also known as an ordered logit/probit model (Christensen, 2015). The core 
reasons for using this estimation method are: (1) it does not assume normal distribution of the 
response variable (collaboration preference) which otherwise biases the standard errors; (2) 
all predicted values will be discrete and within the permissible range (unlike GLS); and (3) 
the cardinal distance between the ordered ratings is not necessarily the same. This is 
appropriate when one does not want to assume for instance that the “mathematical” 
difference between “completely disagree” and “disagree” is necessarily the same as the one 
between “neutral” and “agree”. We used the probit link which is recommended when 
interpreting the model with reference to a latent variable (Christensen, 2015).  
                                                          
2 See appendix for more detail on the methodology 
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We do not add fixed or random effects because in a cross-sectional dataset with 
multiple observations per individual, these would absorb most of the variance we aim to 
explain (e.g. Franke et al., 2006). Even if our explanatory variables would vary within 
individuals, adding fixed effects leads to biased parameters in maximum likelihood models 
due to the incidental parameter problem (Lancaster, 2000). To control for unobserved 
heterogeneity among individuals, we calculated individual average ratings of the rated 
scenarios, and regressed the means of all the explanatory variables on those. The result of this 
regression is highly consistent with the reported regression (available upon request). We 
added the individual residuals from this regression as controls, as well as the mean scenario 
rating, excluding the rating given by the focal individual. 
Response: Collaboration Preference  
 
Respondents were asked to rate eight different collaboration scenarios. Every scenario 
combined one funding source, one type of organization, and four specifications about the 
individual partner: shared contacts, prior familiarity, shared knowledge, and seniority (see 
table 1). Respondents expressed low or high interest in the scenarios by rating them between 0 and 
10 with mean 4.78. Our results are robust for rescaling of the dependent variable to 3 and 5 different 
levels.  Seniority was coded as a measure of similarity using the respondent’s self-reported 
job title. Besides funding source, which was of importance to the KTN, all scenario variables 
are inspection-based measures that are observable at low cost (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), 
which makes them realistically available to those seeking collaborations. 
-------------------------------- Insert table 1 about here --------------------------- 
Scenarios were rated by 3 (due to incomplete responses) up to 16 different 
respondents (mean 8.2)3. Although some scenarios were only rated a few times, this is not a 
problem because the explanatory power of the model depends on how many times each 
                                                          
3 Four respondents rated more than eight scenarios as they took the survey twice. Incorporating these extra 
responses did not alter the results. 
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attribute is judged (minimally 387 times in our data). A full factorial design, in which each 
respondent would be presented with 192 different permutations (4x2x2x3x2x2), places 
excessive cognitive strain on respondents, decreases response rate, and reduces reliability of 
the results (Green, Goldberg, and Montemayor, 1981). Using a completely confounded 
blocks design to allow for interaction effects, all 192 possible scenarios were divided into 24 
blocks of 8 scenarios so that each respondent faced as much variation in the scenario 
attributes as possible (Green et al., 1981). Hybrid forms such as the one we used have been 
found to compare favorably with traditional full profile models (Riquelme and Rickards, 
1992). In total, 201 respondents rated 15754 scenarios.   
Explanatory variables and controls 
 Aspiration gap. We coded aspiration gap based on the following question: “Compared 
with people you consider peers in your chosen field, how successful has your career been? 
Would you say that you are ahead / level / behind your peers?” We coded this as 1 (ahead - 
positive gap), 2 (level - no gap), 3 (behind - negative gap). While this coding imposes 
equidistance between the aspiration levels, our results hold when using dummies as well5.  
Networking skills. We used the mean of six items measuring self-assessments of 
networking skills. The item responses range from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly 
agree) Likert-type scale. Sample questions are “I very often see opportunities for 
collaboration between people”, and “I always try to forge connections between people 
dealing with similar issues”, etc. The factor analysis with promax rotation of these six items 
revealed a single factor. The reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of this scale was 0.82.  
Network awareness and Networking openness. A subset of respondents that was 
seeking specific knowledge was presented with six names of network members with expertise 
                                                          
4 Our final sample consists of only 946 observations from 120 individuals because only individuals that were 
looking for specific knowledge were asked the questions that determined our moderators. 
5 We recognize that we are measuring a current gap between an individual and a social peer and that this need 
not equate an aspiration. Yet such gaps have been used in much of the aspiration literature (e.g. Baum et al., 
2005; Chen, 2008; Gaba and Bhattacharya; 2012, Greve, 2003) 
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in their chosen domain. Respondents were asked how well they knew the person (between 0 
and 10) and whether they would want to collaborate with that person (hovering the mouse 
over the name displayed information about their organization). We define network awareness 
as the sum of the responses to how well they knew the person. Then, we coded every 
response on knowledge/preference that was above (below) the respective mean as 1 (0) and 
summed the number of times the actor preference was above the mean while the actor 
knowledge was below the mean. We call this networking openness (between 0 and 6 
theoretically, but 0 to 5 in the data). The correlation between the two variables is -0.32. 
Control variables. At the individual level, we control for job experience (number of 
years in current organization) and the number of years worked before the current job. We also 
construct a factor that captures the relative seniority between the person in the scenario 
(junior, mid-career, or senior) and the respondent. We further include the other five scenario 
variables, whether the respondent’s organization is R&D active, internationally active, and 
has prior experience with government-funded projects. Finally, we control for respondent 
organization type, the collaboration type the respondent’s organization is interested in 
(marketing, operational, technological, or undefined), include (non-reported) dummies for the 
respondent’s sought field of expertise to insulate knowledge domain specific effects, and 
controls for unexplained scenario and individual heterogeneity.  
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1, finds support in Model 1 (b1 = -0.93, b2 = 0.27, both p ≤ 0.01). A 
negative aspiration gap clearly increases an individual’s propensity to collaborate, while there 
is also a small increase in the collaboration preference of those who are ahead. Figure 1 thus 
depicts a falling L-shape. All figures represent the percentage change in collaboration 
propensity relative to no aspiration gap at the mean of the focal variable with all significant 
non-focal variables set to their mean. Figures 3 - 5 show the mean and mean +/- two standard 
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deviations. We use the coefficients from the highly similar, but non-reported full OLS model 
because they can be converted more sensibly to percentage changes. We perform simple 
slope tests to check the statistical significance of the slopes (Robinson, Tomek, and 
Schumacker, 2013), and found significant t-tests for all 3 interaction effects (p ≤ 0.001).  
------------ Insert table 2 and figures 2 – 5 about here ----------- 
Hypothesis 2a suggested networking skills positively moderate the aspiration-gap - 
preference relationship. Model 2a shows significant interactions terms (b1 = -1.08 and b2 = 
0.28; p ≤ 0.01 for both). Figure 3 shows that without aspiration gap, skills do not significantly 
affect collaboration preference. However, when the gap is negative or positive we see those 
with higher skills are more likely to collaborate while those with low skills exhibit a threat-
rigidity response and are less likely to collaborate (Hu et al., 2011). Importantly, networking 
skills do not determine the aspiration gap as the means for being behind, level, or ahead of 
peers are 1.59/1.63/1.61, and statistically insignificant. Hypothesis 2a cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 2b postulated a positive interaction between networking openness and 
aspiration gap. Model 2b supports this hypothesis (b1 = -1.82, p ≤ 0.01 and b2 = 0.34, p ≤ 
0.05): Individuals with high openness who face an aspiration gap have higher collaboration 
preferences. Figure 4 shows the effects are more pronounced than for the skills moderation. 
The moderation effect is stronger with a negative aspiration gap: A highly open slacker is 
about 60 percent more favorable toward collaboration than an averagely open respondent 
who’s level with peers. We also find negative effects for low openness. 
Finally, hypothesis 2c posited that network awareness would negatively moderate the 
aspiration-gap - preference relationship and the results in Model 2c confirm the hypothesis 
(b1 = 0.34, p ≤ 0.001 and b2 = -0.09, p ≤ 0.01). Slackers know, on average, more people in 
the network with statistically significant differences in the mean (9.66 > 8.78 > 7.61). Figure 
5 shows again the virtually zero effect of network awareness in the absence of an aspiration 
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gap. However, when there is an aspiration gap, low network awareness makes individuals 
more prone to collaborate while high awareness reduces collaboration preference. Against 
expectations, slackers seem to be more selective than leaders when they have high network 
awareness as they rate scenarios about 12% lower than leaders. Hypothesis 2c cannot be 
rejected. This could perhaps be due to a threat-rigidity reflex kicking in (Hu et al., 2011).   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
One of the predominant limitations in the strategy literature has often been our 
inability to understand individual preferences, which explains the relative lack of work on 
how individuals make choices that shape networks (Kilduff and Brass, 2010) and influence 
strategic action (Felin and Foss, 2005). Thus, most research on the antecedents of 
collaboration and collaborative invention has ignored the individual’s characteristics. We 
theorized and found that individual aspiration gaps influence collaboration preferences and 
that relational capability, captured by networking skills, openness, and network awareness, 
moderate the aspiration-gap – collaboration preference relationship. In doing so, we 
overcome the problem of sample bias, inherent in most research on alliance antecedents 
(Mindruta, 2013) and improve understanding of the individual determinants of collaboration. 
Although preferences do not automatically translate to organizational action (Powell et al., 
2011; Vissa, 2011), understanding collaboration drivers is important to facilitate joint 
knowledge creation: Why and with whom researchers want to collaborate can increase the 
likelihood of tie formation, the knowledge-generating potential, and the success of actual 
collaborations, because what drives us to work together is not necessarily beneficial to 
performance (Saxton, 1997). 
Behavioral strategists have argued that strategic decision-making matters exactly 
because differences between individuals perpetuate organizational heterogeneity (Bromiley, 
2009; Levinthal, 2011). While scholars started looking at behavioral and psychological 
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foundations of dynamic capabilities (Abell, Felin, and Foss, 2008; Hodgkinson and Healey, 
2011; Winter, 2012), we break new ground, investigating the behavioral foundations of 
collaboration. Importantly, the moderating effects of relational capability increase our 
understanding of the contingent relevance of individual aspirations. We found great similarity 
between those facing a negative or positive aspirational gap. Whether collaborations (and 
preferences to collaborate) are perceived to be risky depends on one’s relational capability -- 
and this capability seems instrumental in figuring out what knowledge transfer members want 
to do within the network.  
Given the focus on explaining individual preferences for collaboration, an important 
issue is to explore plausible alternative explanations. Different organizations present 
individuals with varying incentives for collaboration. The fact that we find differences 
between the responses of individuals in academia and in the private sector suggests that 
incentives may play a role, because one could assume that industry members face different 
incentives than academic scientists. A comparison of means shows that academic respondents 
are on average more willing to collaborate than industry respondents. This difference is most 
pronounced when it comes to government funding. Thus, in order to foster collaboration, 
funding agencies should investigate how to make government-funded projects more 
appealing to industry members. 
Regarding aspirations, 41.48% of firm respondents argue to be ahead of their peers 
liken to only 21.72% of academics. This result suggests that aspirations of firm members 
have a stronger influence than those of their academic counterparts. Consistent with our 
hypotheses, we find that when splitting the sample based on aspirations, we have significant 
positive effects for openness and networking skills for those who claim to be ahead of or 
behind their peers and no effects for those who are level with their peers. The effect of 
network awareness is negative but not significant. Future research could investigate whether 
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the organizational context affects the impact of individual aspirations. Longitudinal studies of 
individual aspirations and collaborations could also clarify to what extent engaging in 
collaborations alters self-perceptions about one’s career and whether higher collaboration 
preferences result in a higher incidence of collaborations or not.  
The relative unimportance of relational capability for those who are level with peers 
has managerial implications. It is difficult to directly influence an individual’s self-perception 
liken to his/her social peers, so that a manager is left with using various forms of training as 
levers to instigate a more positive attitude towards joint knowledge creation. Yet, our 
findings suggest that fostering relational capabilities is likely to be less effective without 
changes in aspiration levels. Future research on the behavioral origins of collaboration could 
investigate which other individual characteristics affect tie formation intention and explore 
the relations between individual preferences, actual tie formation, and successful 
collaborative outcomes.  
In our research, we contrasted social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) and 
behavioral theory (Cyert and March, 1963). We suggest that leaders in emerging 
technological fields are conflicted by a willingness to help others get ahead and risk-
averseness. Our findings suggest that having sufficient relational capability is a necessary 
condition for helping to occur. The literature on help-giving has so far chiefly studied the 
drivers of helping, mainly looking at reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), status implications (Flynn 
et al., 2006), and larger cultural aspects (Miller and Bersoff, 1998), or how a helper’s 
perception of others affect her likelihood of helping (McNeely and Meglino, 1994). More 
recently, Grant and Dutton (2012) found that reflecting on one’s own past activities as a 
helper increases pro-social behavior. While most of these findings are situated in 
experimental settings or within organizational boundaries, our results suggest that in 
emerging technological fields, and under specific individual conditions of both capabilities 
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and positive aspirational gaps, helping might transcend organizational boundaries and extend 
to knowledge transfer networks. This provides an exciting avenue for future research to 
investigate how such boundary-spanning helping is affected by (organizational) identity and 
what the strategic consequences for performance or alliance success are. 
Besides the importance of aspirations, some of our controls shed light on who wants 
to partner with whom. Significant signs for respondents being respectively more (b = -0.27, p 
≤ 0,01) or less (b = 0.24, p ≤ 0,05) senior than a scenario partner suggest that findings on the 
occurrence of similarity in established ties can be driven by a reverse selection process, rather 
than a preference for similarity. This raises questions about whether findings on homophily 
are the pure consequence of an underlying preference of both partners to work similar others, 
or whether people in general prefer to work with someone who is at least like them or 
preferably ‘higher up the value chain’. Additionally, despite a common belief that firms join 
KTNs to collaborate with universities, our findings suggest the opposite6. KTNs could exploit 
this knowledge and foster learning by specifically funding research that crosses 
organizational types, seniority boundaries, and previously developed relationships. 
Finally, our innovative use of conjoint analysis could inspire future research. While 
this method is commonly used by marketers to determine desirable product attributes, we use 
it as a way of exposing the impact of individual characteristics on preferences, controlling for 
a variety of scenario attributes. This allows us, through a survey, to place people in different 
situations (i.e. collaboration scenarios) and investigate the characteristics that, regardless of 
the attributes of the collaboration scenario, influence the revealed preference. As such, this 
method can be used to investigate other behavioral aspects of strategic decision-making.  
                                                          
6 An alternative coding of the respondent organization and the scenario organization, similar to the coding for 
seniority, makes this very clear. One can infer the same from Model 3 as signs for both ‘respondent organization 
is a firm’ (b = -0.21, p < 0.05) and ‘scenario partner organization is a university’ (b = -0.17, p < 0.05) are both 
negative and significant.  
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This study is plausibly among the first to show how individual aspirations can 
influence organizational collaboration preferences. We found the effects are contingent on 
complementary relational capability, which illuminates how non-focal skills play a role in the 
co-creation of new knowledge. We hope future research can disentangle the differences 
between a star scientist, a star researcher, and a star networker as well as contingencies that 
determine when specific aspects of relational capability matter. Such findings will not only 
affect the management of R&D teams, but also and perhaps as importantly, the education of 
engineers and natural scientists.  
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Figure 1: Overview of Hypothesized Effects 
Aspiration Gap 
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Propensity 
Negative Gap 
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− (risk avoidance)  
+ (helping others) 
Networking Skills  
and Openness  
Network Awareness 
+ (↓ risk of 
collaboration) 
− (↑ selectivity and ↑ 
opportunity costs) 
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Table 1: Match characteristics and their relative prevalence in scenarios 
Scenario 
characteristics 
Level (prevalence)  Description of factor and level given to respondent 
Seniority of partner 
Junior (491) Lecturer or research associate; junior scientist or engineer 
Middle (535) Senior lecturer or reader; group leader or senior scientist 
Senior (549) Professor; R&D or other director (e.g. CTO, CEO) 
Familiarity 
Distant (771) Someone you don’t know or only know distantly 
Close (804) Someone you know well and enjoy being with 
Shared Contacts 
Not Known (787) Unknown to people you collaborate/work with                 
Known (788) Known to people you collaborate/work with 
Knowledge  
Different (765) Partner’s work draws on different technology/science from yours 
Similar (810) Partner’s work draws on similar technology/science to yours 
Resource 
Provisioning 
No funding (387) Informal collaboration; no funding available 
Govt. funding (389) Government funding covers half of each party’s costs 
Partner funding (410) Partner’s organization covers your costs 
Self-funding (389) You cover the partner’s costs as well as your own 
Organization type 
University (763) Works for a university 
Company (812) Works for a company 
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Table 2: Cumulative Probit Model: Stepwise Analysis 
 
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 3 
Interaction effects 
      
Networking Skills * Aspirations 
  
-1.08**  (0.33) 
  
-1.03**  (0.34) 
Netw. Skills * Aspirations ^ 2 
  
 0.28**  (0.09) 
  
 0.25**  (0.09) 
Networking Openness * Aspirations 
   
-1.28**  (0.47) 
 
-0.96*  (0.48) 
Netw. Openness * Aspirations ^ 2 
   
 0.34*  (0.15) 
 
 0.25††  (0.15) 
Network Awareness * Aspirations 
    
 0.34***  (0.1)  0.29**  (0.11) 
Netw. Awareness * Aspirations ^ 2 
    
-0.09**  (0.03) -0.08**  (0.03) 
Focal effects 
      
Aspirations 
 
-0.93**  (0.34)  0.81  (0.64)  0.65  (0.52) -3.95***(0.98) -0.66  (1.25) 
Aspirations ^ 2 
 
 0.27**  (0.1) -0.19  (0.17) -0.12  (0.15)  1.07***(0.28)  0.26  (0.35) 
Networking Skills 
 
 0.14**  (0.04)  1.06***(0.29)  0.13**  (0.04)  0.14**  (0.04)  1.07***  (0.3) 
Networking Openness 
 
 0.11***  (0.03)  0.11***(0.03)  1.23***(0.34)  0.12***(0.03)  0.97**  (0.35) 
Network Awareness 
 
-0.02  (0.01) -0.02  (0.01) -0.03*  (0.01) -0.31***(0.09) -0.28**  (0.09) 
Respondent 
      
Experience on the job -0.01**  (0) -0.01**  (0) -0.01**  (0) -0.01*  (0) -0.02**  (0) -0.01*  (0.01) 
Experience prior to job 0.0  (0) -0.01†  (0) -0.01  (0) -0.01†  (0) -0.01†  (0) -0.01†  (0) 
More senior than collaborator -0.3***  (0.09) -0.29**  (0.09) -0.28**  (0.09) -0.28**  (0.09) -0.29**  (0.09) -0.27**  (0.09) 
Less senior than collaborator  0.27**  (0.1)  0.28**  (0.1)  0.27**  (0.1)  0.24*  (0.1)  0.28**  (0.1)  0.24*  (0.1) 
Not a researcher -0.22*  (0.11) -0.31**  (0.11) -0.29**  (0.11) -0.32**  (0.11) -0.3**  (0.11) -0.29**  (0.11) 
Respondent Organization 
      
R&D active (1 = yes) -0.19†  (0.1) -0.09  (0.1) -0.11  (0.1) -0.12  (0.1) -0.11  (0.1) -0.15  (0.1) 
Internationally active  (1 = yes)  0.24†  (0.13)  0.24.  (0.13)  0.27*  (0.13)  0.24†  (0.13)  0.24.  (0.13)  0.28*  (0.13) 
Collaboration experience  (1 = yes)  0.13  (0.09)  0.14  (0.09)  0.17†  (0.09)  0.11  (0.09)  0.12  (0.09)  0.12  (0.09) 
Operational collaboration  -0.11  (0.13) -0.14  (0.13) -0.07  (0.13) -0.17  (0.13) -0.12  (0.13) -0.09  (0.13) 
No Collaboration  -0.29  (0.26) -0.13  (0.28) -0.22  (0.28) -0.18  (0.28) -0.31  (0.29) -0.45  (0.3) 
Technological collaboration   0.01  (0.08)  0.01  (0.08)  0.01  (0.08) -0.02  (0.08)  0.02  (0.08)  0.0  (0.08) 
Organization is Government actor  0.01  (0.2)  0.14  (0.2)  0.19  (0.2)  0.04  (0.2)  0.19  (0.2)  0.14  (0.2) 
Organization is Firm (Uni is default) -0.25**  (0.1) -0.21*  (0.1) -0.16  (0.1) -0.28**  (0.1) -0.19†  (0.1) -0.21*  (0.1) 
Scenario Variables 
      
Partner organization is university -0.17*  (0.07) -0.18**  (0.07) -0.18**  (0.07) -0.17*  (0.07) -0.18**  (0.07) -0.17*  (0.07) 
Partner funding  0.38***  (0.1)  0.39***  (0.1)  0.38***  (0.1)  0.4***  (0.1)  0.4***  (0.1)  0.4***  (0.1) 
No funding -0.17†  (0.1) -0.17†  (0.1) -0.17†  (0.1) -0.15  (0.1) -0.17†  (0.1) -0.17†  (0.1) 
Self-funding  -0.51***  (0.1) -0.51***  (0.1) -0.51***  (0.1) -0.49***  (0.1) -0.52***  (0.1) -0.51***  (0.1) 
Shared ties with potential partner  0.21**  (0.07)  0.22**  (0.07)  0.22**  (0.07)  0.21**  (0.07)  0.22**  (0.07)  0.21**  (0.07) 
Not a close friend of respondent -0.29***(0.07) -0.29***  (0.07) -0.28***  (0.07) -0.27***  (0.07) -0.29***  (0.07) -0.28***  (0.07) 
Similar knowledge to respondent -0.04  (0.07) -0.04  (0.07) -0.04  (0.07) -0.03  (0.07) -0.04  (0.07) -0.04  (0.07) 
Additional Controls       
Sought Knowledge Dummies included included included included included included 
Propensity Residual 0.48***0.03)  0.5***  (0.03)  0.5***  (0.03)  0.5***  (0.03)  0.5***  (0.03)  0.51***(0.03) 
Mean rating scenario others  0.05†  (0.03)  0.05*  (0.03)  0.06*  (0.03)  0.06*  (0.03)  0.05*  (0.03)  0.07**  (0.03) 
       Observations 946 946 946 946 946 946 
Akaike Information Criterion 4,047.69 4,024.90 4,018.30 4,007.73 4,017.71 3,999.76 
Log Likelihood -1,986.85 -1,970.45*** -1,965.15** -1,959.87*** -1,964.71** -1,951.88** 
 
Interpretation:, *** , p ≤ 0.001 ; **, p ≤ 0.01; *, p ≤ 0.05 ; †, p ≤ 0.1 ;††, p = 0.104 (This value was significant in the OLS model 
at p = 0.064 and is hence used in the graphical representation of the effects) 
Significance of the change in Log Likelihood Ratio is determined by comparison to best available nested model  
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 APPENDIX: CONJOINT STUDY DESIGN 
 
Conjoint analysis and conjoint experiments are rather well known in marketing, but 
have been used scarcely in management and innovation (see Riquelme and Rickards, 1992 
for an exception), though more frequently in entrepreneurship (Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998 - 
JBV; Shepherd, 1999 - MS; Franke et al., 2006 - JBV; Fischer and Henkel, 2013 - RP). This 
type of research design is typically used to explore the preference structure of individuals 
regarding a product or service. Because individuals tend to find it difficult to rate how much 
they value a specific attribute of a product, the conjoint design presents respondents with 
more holistic and realistic options to rate. In doing so, it facilitates the process for individuals 
who are not required to introspectively dissect their own preference structure. As such, the 
conjoint method is potentially very useful to identify how individuals make trade-offs 
between multiple attributes of a single product or service (Green, Krieger, and Wind, 2001). 
As an example, think about having the rate individual attributes of a wallet (fabric, number of 
card slots, thickness, whether or not there is a pocket for change, how it opens, whether or not 
there is a transparent window for an ID card, whether there is a specific card slot for a 
contactless payment card on the outside…). This becomes rather complex immediately. 
Conjoint design presumes that people find it easier to just compare and rate various real 
wallets without necessarily needing to understand why they prefer one over the other.  
 
We use this method to investigate collaboration preferences. Rather than asking 
consumers about a product, we presented firm and university respondents with various 
collaboration scenarios, determined by different combinations to six collaboration attributes. 
The six attributes had a total of 15 different levels between them (see table), leading to 192 
different possible combinations for a full factorial design (2*2*2*2*3*4 = 192). Presenting 
respondents with all possible permutations places an undue burden on their cognitive 
capacities and would dramatically increase response time to the survey and consequentially 
lower response rate. Additionally such designs are argued to have lower reliability (Green, 
Goldberg, and Montemayor, 1981). Therefore, researchers commonly implement fractional 
factorial designs in which only a fraction of the total number of permutations are used or all 
are used but a fraction is presented to individual respondents. One such example is a 
confounded blocks design as we used. Such hybrid forms generally compare favourably with 
traditional full profile models (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992).  
 
We split the 192 permutations in 24 blocks of 8 scenarios and each respondent rated 
one block of eight. In order to ensure that each scenario was rated approximately the same 
number of times across the whole set of respondents, the web-based survey tool allocated 
blocks to respondents in a sequential order, ensuring that each block is rated by about the 
same number of respondents. Of course, data incompleteness forced us to delete some 
observations so that the final data set is not perfectly balanced across scenarios. This is 
however not problematic as the interest is typically in finding out what the average 
contribution of an individual attribute to a specific scenario is. 
 
Various computer programs can generate orthogonal designs that guarantee all (or 
most) combinations of attributes and their various values co-occur various times. We used a 
design with a high resolution (including all possible scenarios) so that interaction effects 
between the attributes could be estimated (Yong, 2004). Because we do not test for 
interaction effects specifically, researchers can use scenario fixed or random effects or 
control for the average rating per scenario (as we did).  
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Our interest in studying collaboration preferences, and our ambition to avoid the bias 
inherent in research that looks at established collaborations to study collaboration antecedents 
(Mindruta, 2014), drove us towards a conjoint method design. Although not the focus of our 
paper here, conjoint analysis enables us to investigate which scenario attributes are, on 
average, most influential in the formation of preferences. We strongly believe individual 
preferences are relevant in the future (attempted) formation of actual ties (Ajzen, 1991; Vissa, 
2011), which makes the study of preferences important to uncover the micro-foundations of 
strategy (Felin and Foss, 2005). In this regard, the conjoint method provides a useful toolkit 
for the strategy researcher, especially those interested in micro-foundations, to study the 
underlying individual and firm-idiosyncratic drivers of collaborations or other organizational 
decisions in a granular and experimental way. Because established collaborations are the 
outcome of a matching process (Mindruta, 2014; Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009), or 
organizational decisions regarding investments for instance are the result of compromise 
and/or political bargaining, conjoint analysis is a method that allows the study of the 
underlying root-positions of organizations and individuals. Longitudinal designs that start 
from preferences and ideal cases and evolve into studies of actual collaborations or 
investments for instance could strongly enrich our understanding of the determinants of 
successful performance and to what extent they are also the driving factors behind the initial 
decisions. In other words, the conjoint method could help uncover whether success is the 
result of planning or luck. 
 
 
